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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS ORTIZ, 
vs. 
Plaintifi7Appellant 
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS, 
Defendants/Appellees 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 950391-CA 
Priority No. 15 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF 
FACTS AND ARGUMENT REGARDING THE JURY'S FINDING 
OF "NO NEGLIGENCE" ON THE PART OF GENEVA ROCK 
PRODUCTS 
POINT I — DEFENDANT, IN HIS STATEMENT OF THE CASE, 
MISCHARACTERIZES THE TRIAL TESTIMONY ON SEVERAL KEY 
ISSUES 
Defendant states, "The plaintiff knew that he was standing in an area where the 
concrete chute would hit him if the mechanics were able to get the chute working." (Brief 
of Appellee at 2, fl5). In fact, this is precisely the opposite of what plaintiff testified: 
Q. [By defendant's counsel] Was there any doubt in your mind that 
you were standing in an area where you could be hit by the chute if it 
swung? 
1 
A. [Ortiz] It didn't even enter into my mind; I am sorry. 
(R. at 570). 
Defendant's brief then goes on to state that "plaintiff agreed that he did not need 
to be in the area where he was standing..." (Brief of Appellee at 2,1(8), and that no one, 
not even plaintiffs supervisor Cisneros, told him to stand in that area or felt he "needed" 
to stand there (Brief of Appellee at 2, ffif 9, 10). Defendant omits the fact that plaintiff 
testified he "always" stood in the work area (R. at 575), and that Cisneros knew where 
Ortiz was standing and believed this to be an appropriate place for Ortiz to stand and wait 
(R. at 385, 398). 
Further, as to the testimony of Stephen Barnes, the mechanic involved in the 
incident, defendant states that when Barnes "arrived at the scene and began working on 
the truck, the plaintiff was not present in the area, nor was any other member of the 
concrete finishing crew," (Brief of Appellee at 3, f^ 12), and that when Barnes arrived at 
the scene, "he noticed that there were no workers anywhere near the area where the 
concrete truck was situated." (Brief of Appellee at 7) 
In fact, Barnes contradicted himself on this issue, testifying both that he noticed 
there were no workers in the area, and that he didn't notice whether or not there was 
anyone in the area: 
Q. (examination by defendant) When you got to the truck to work 
on it, was there a crew, any finishing crew in the area? 
A. (Barnes) I didn't see any. [R at 646] 
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Q. Did you wonder where the crew was when you first pulled up? 
A. Yeah. When I first got there, I didn't see anybody around and I 
asked Paul where the finishers were and he said they were down the street. 
[R. at 649] 
• • • • 
Q. (examination by plaintiff) And when you first arrived, there was 
nobody in this area? 
A. (Barnes) I never noticed whether there was anyone there or not. 
[R. at 657] 
Obviously, it mischaracterized the trial testimony to imply that this witness made 
a conscious effort to check the area to see if anyone was present in the area of the truck 
and chute, when the witness himself is unclear about what he did or did not see or do 
when he arrived on the scene. Furthermore, both Cisneros and Ortiz testified that 
Ortiz was in the area when Barnes arrived, because Ortiz had accompanied the truck 
when the driver moved it to show Cisneros where the next pour area would be (R. at 
384, 535). 
Finally, defendant states that, after the chute froze up, the driver moved the truck 
to "a different area" to effect repairs on site (Brief of Appellee at 6). Presumably, this is 
an attempt to suggest that the driver had made a conscientious decision to move the truck 
so that the repair work would not endanger the finishing crew. However, there was no 
testimony presented that this was the case. Rather, the testimony of both Ortiz and 
Cisneros was that the driver, accompanied by Ortiz, simply moved the truck to "the next 
pour area," (R. at 384, 535), the very work area where the finishing crew would go once 
they had completed their work in the area that had already been poured. It is absurd to 
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suggest that the driver did not know Ortiz was there or that he did not expect the crew to 
arrive in the new work area. 
POINT II — ALL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND ARGUMENTS SET 
FORTH BY THE DEFENDANT, BOTH AT TRIAL AND IN HIS BRIEF, 
SPEAK TO THE ISSUE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. AT NO 
TIME DOES DEFENDANT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE OR 
ARGUMENT WHATSOEVER OF "NO NEGLIGENCE" ON THE PART 
OF THE DEFENDANT, GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS 
Defendant, both at trial and in his brief, centered all his factual allegations, 
testimony and argument around the issue of whether or not the plaintiff was also 
negligent in his actions which resulted in the accident at issue. All testimony cited in by 
defendant in his Statement of the Case and subsequent Argument [much of it disputed 
above by plaintiff] attempts to argue that plaintiff knew or should have known that he 
was standing in a dangerous area, and that, in so doing, he exhibited negligent, 
unreasonable or inappropriate behavior. However, defendant presents no evidence 
whatsoever to counter plaintiffs evidence that defendant was negligent. 
In his opening remarks to the jury, defendant's counsel acknowledges that his 
client was negligent, but that he intended to show to the jury that the plaintiff was also 
negligent: 
(Naegle to the jury) You will have to determine who is really 
responsible. Whether Mr. Ortiz is at least equally responsible for his own 
conduct. We will take half of the blame, but Mr. Ortiz must take the other 
half... (emphasis added) [R. at 373] 
Having set forth to the jury that his client was "half' responsible for the accident, 
defendant's counsel then elicits testimony from plaintiff designed to show that plaintiff, 
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also, was negligent. At no time during the trial does defendant present even a scintilla of 
evidence that defendant's actions which resulted in injury to the plaintiff were not in any 
way negligent 
Defendant did not call the driver of the truck to the testify, and the mechanic 
involved in the accident testified both he should have broken down the chute before 
attempting any repairs and that the driver of the truck was ultimately responsible for 
actions of the cement chute (see statements and argument in Point I, above), assessments 
that were shared by plaintiffs witnesses Cisneros and Padgen (see statements and 
argument in Point III, below). 
Consequently, in his brief, defendant is unable to cite to any statement on the 
record that might suggest that defendant was not guilty of any negligence in the actions 
resulting in this accident. Instead, defendant once again makes factual allegations, some 
disputed by plaintiff, but all speaking solely to the issue of plaintiff s alleged comparative 
negligence. Defendant's entire argument, is therefore, irrelevant, as the issue at bar does 
not concern comparative negligence, but involves only the finding of "no negligence" on 
the part of the defendant. 
Clearly, because of the admission by defendant's counsel that his client was half 
responsible for the accident, combined with the fact that defendant's counsel presented no 
evidence exonerating completely his client's actions, it is impossible that the jury, upon 
reviewing the evidence, could have come to a verdict of "no negligence" on the part of 
Geneva Rock Products. 
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POINT III — PLAINTIFF CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, BOTH AT TRIAL 
AND IN HIS APPEAL BRIEF, THE "STANDARD OF CARE" FOR THE 
ON-SITE REPAIR OF THE CEMENT CHUTE THROUGH THE 
TESTIMONY OF GARY CISNEROS, GEORGE PADGEN, AND 
STEPHEN BARNES. 
Defendant contradicts himself in his argument regarding expert testimony 
concerning the "standard of care" for the repair of the cement chute. Defendant first 
contends that plaintiff knew he was in a "dangerous area," knew the chute was broken 
and that the mechanic and driver were trying to repair it, had "some 20 years experience 
in the concrete business" (R. at 569), and so on and so forth. (Brief of Appellee at 2) In 
fact, defendant argues that plaintiffs experience in concrete work had resulted in such a 
high level of knowledge regarding the standard of care for repairing cement truck chutes, 
that plaintiff "negligently placed himself in a position of danger and that his injury was a 
result of his own failure to act reasonably." (Brief of Appellee at 8) 
Defendant then goes on to argue that neither the plaintiff Ortiz, his supervisor 
Gary Cisneros, nor even plaintiffs expert George Padgen, "had any expertise regarding 
the standard of care for repairing cement trucks, either on site or at the shop." (Brief of 
Appellee at 3, ^fll) 
Clearly, defendant has defeated himself with his own argument. Cisneros and 
Padgen each had more than 20 years experience in the concrete business. (R. at 377,405) 
Both were supervisors who possessed, by virtue of their experience [as acknowledged by 
defendant], expertise in the standard of care required for the on-site repair of a cement 
truck chute. Both testified that plaintiff was standing in a reasonable and appropriate 
area when the incident occurred (R. at 385, 398, 412, 417). Both testified that the driver 
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of the cement truck is responsible at all times for the location and action of the cement 
chute, and that it is the driver's responsibility to keep the chute out of the worker's area 
(R. at 399, 417), an expert opinion also expressed by defendant's own witness, Stephen 
Barnes, the mechanic involved in the incident (R. at 656-657). Both testified that the 
chute should have been "broken down" before any repair was attempted (R. at 389-90, 
415, 417), again an expert opinion also expressed by defendant's own witness, the 
mechanic involved in the incident (R. at 659). Even if defendant is reluctant to accept the 
expertise of plaintiff s witnesses, which expertise was not challenged at any time during 
the trial defendant must accept the expertise of his own witness, the mechanic Stephen 
Barnes. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF 
FACTS AND ARGUMENT REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
In responding to plaintiffs Issue No. 2, defendant again brings up a series of 
statements which do not speak to the issue of the admission of testimony regarding 
injuries to the plaintiff which were not related to the accident. During the trial, defendant 
cross-examined plaintiff regarding several accidents which resulted in injuries to 
plaintiffs neck, shoulder, knee, etc. (R. at 578-586) None of these accidents caused or 
were related in any way to the accident or the plaintiffs injuries which resulted from the 
accident To briefly quote again from Biswell 
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The rule is well settled that when a defendant's negligence 
aggravates or lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition, or one 
to which the injured person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to the 
injured person for the full amount of damages which ensue, 
notwithstanding such diseased or weakened condition. 
Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80,88 (Utah App. 1987) [See Brief of Appellant at 18.] 
Defendant, in his brief, dismisses this ruling without explanation, and instead cites 
Turner v. General Adjusting Bureau, Inc. 832 P.2d 62, 69-70 (Utah App. 1992), applying 
the "thin skull9' rule, as the determinative ruling on this issue. The two rulings appear, 
then, to be contradictory, but the closer look shows they are not. 
The Turner ruling states that plaintiff may not recover for any pre-existing 
condition, and, indeed, plaintiff is not attempting to recover damages from defendant as 
to any of the other injuries plaintiff may have suffered previously in his lifetime. The 
trial court allowed testimony of previous injuries to plaintiff's neck, shoulder, et al., 
although plaintiff was not seeking recovery for any of those alleged injuries. Any 
testimony presented by defendant regarding these alleged injuries was, therefore, 
irrelevant and, likely, prejudicial 
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was working, was not under any medical care 
or engaged in any physical therapy, and was not complaining of any injury to his back. 
Hence, according to Turner, defendant, and the jury, was required to accept plaintiff 
as they found him at the time of the accident — apparently healthy, active and 
employed. According to the evidence, whatever damage may have been done to his back 
from previous accidents was latent. The Biswell ruling states that if defendant's actions 
aggravates or lights up a latent injury, then defendant is responsible for the full amount of 
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damages caused by the injury. Unless such evidence involved an active, debilitating 
injury to plaintiffs back, any testimony presented by defendant regarding previous back 
injuries can only be irrelevant and, likely, prejudicial. 
Furthermore, evidence that plaintiff's knee might have eventually collapsed is also 
irrelevant and prejudicial. Plaintiff's knee is not the injury being complained of, and, 
according to the evidence presented at trial, at the time of the accident, any alleged injury 
to plaintiffs knee was also latent and was not a factor in precipitating the accident. 
Again, any testimony presented by defendant regarding this injury was, therefore, 
irrelevant and, likely, prejudicial 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence is clear that the jury disregarded all evidence as well as the 
admissions of defendant's own counsel in finding "no negligence" on the part of Geneva 
Rock Products. The jury's verdict and the trial court's amended judgment should be set 
aside. Alternatively, this Court should determine that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying plaintiffs Motion in Limine and should remand this case for a new trial with 
instructions to bar all such evidence relating to alleged injuries which plaintiff might have 
sustained in previous, unrelated accidents. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 1997. 
^ A*/ * * 
/ k \ T T B I L J A > j r 
' Attorney for Plaintiff Louis Ortiz 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of January, 1997, I mailed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS to: 
GEORGE T. NAEGLE, Esq. (5001) 
GARY L. JOHNSON, Esq. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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